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Terrorism in the Middle East has plagued the United States for over a decade and groups, like ISIS, show
that terrorism can be well organized and financed. From a homemade bomb to a small army, each act of
terrorism requires funding to turn hateful speech into an action. In the Middle East, funding for terrorism
falls into three major categories: criminal, legal, and charity from like-minded individuals. Despite public
disdain for global terror there are still some individuals, both foreign and domestic, who seek to fund
terrorist attacks. Finding the sources of this funding is essential in order to stem terrorism, but doing so is
not always easy. Those who fund terror do so through many mediums such as: black markets, offshore
accounts, phony companies, and illegal shipments; which can make it very hard to track. By looking at past
investigations on terrorism in the Middle East to see what patterns emerge, investigators can be pointed
towards places where they can most effectively use their resources to stop future terrorist funding.
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1. Introduction:
Terrorism in the Middle East is a significant issue that has pulled the whole world into a war, not of nation
against nation, but of small battles across the globe; fought by individuals and financed by a vast network of
crime. The three major sources of funding for terror groups come from: criminal activity, legitimate business,
and donations. Each of these categories present unique challenges because they utilize different techniques
and methods. Understanding how each method works is the first step in developing a plan to counteract, or
prevent, terrorism.

2. Crime:
The proceeds of criminal activity make up a large amount of funds that end up supporting terrorism1. While
some may look at terrorist organizations as similar in nature to the American Mafia, Italian Mafia or other
ethnically based criminal organizations, it is important to notice the differences between a mafia style
organization and a terrorist organization. Mafia style organizations are crime centered, they earn money and
maintain power through a carefully laid out and maintained criminal network. This network includes all kinds
of crimes from petty theft to grand larceny. Terrorist organizations, on the other hand, are not usually
organized to make money but to win a political debate through the use of force, fear, and the infliction of
damage to political or social order. In addition, terror groups often have donors who provide significant
funding and support the political, social, or religious goals of the terrorists. Therefore, because the proceeds
of criminal activity can be thought of as serving as a form of supplemental income for terrorist organizations,
an exclusive or primary focus on criminal conduct may not be successful. Some commentators believe that

the terrorist group ISIS (ISIL) is a notable exception to this rule, as their size and need for increasing amounts
of money has driven them to rely on a great deal of criminal activity such as drug trafficking, smuggling, and
to a lesser degree counterfeiting to meet their need for terrorist financing2.

2.1 Drug Trade:
The drug trade, especially from Afghanistan, provides Middle Eastern terror groups with significant amounts
of money each year3. For many groups, including the Taliban, drugs offer a very attractive solution for money
as they do not need to actually invest manpower in farming the crops; instead they either own opium farms
or co-opt locals who already farm the land. Afghanistan is the world’s largest supplier of opium, producing
an estimated 380 tons each year4. To put this number into perspective, the United Nations estimates total
global amounts of heroin on the market or seized at around 440 tons, and the annual global consumption as
only 340 tons5. Afghanistan’s production can supply most of the world’s demand for heroin. This large and
global business creates several billion dollars worth of revenue each year, with much of it going to support
Islamic terrorist organizations. The fact that the majority of opium fields in Afghanistan are controlled
directly by insurgents, ensures that a larger share of any money earned will go directly back to their parent
terrorist organizations6. As with all traffic in contraband, ownership of distribution and trafficking routes is
also very valuable. In this way, though ISIS does not actually grow any opium it earns a great amount of
revenue from drug trafficking. Through its control of land ISIS gets money from international drug traffickers
by allowing their drug smugglers safe passage through their lands for money7. The approach taken by ISIS
demonstrates the value to terrorists of controlling trade routes and transportation capabilities and underscores
the sophistication of ISIS among other terrorist organizations.

2.2 Cigarettes and Baby Formula:
The sale of smuggled goods, both expected and unexpected provide funding for terror. Most people are not
likely to be surprised that the smuggling of items, such as cigarettes provides fairly steady income for the
terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda and HAMAS. Such smuggling is not limited to activities
in foreign countries. Unbeknownst to the general public, Hezbollah has a significant domestic presence in
the United States. The group is present here in the form of various terror cells that are used for fundraising
and even recruitment8. A fairly large cell was recently discovered and suppressed in North Carolina9.
Information gathered by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) indicated that the
aforementioned terrorist groups had run a sophisticated cigarette smuggling operation between North
Carolina and Michigan. The terrorist groups exploited the fact that these two states have different taxes on
the purchase of cigarettes. The terrorists would buy the cigarettes in North Carolina, with a tax of 5 cents,
and sell them in Michigan, where taxes ran to 75 cents, keeping the difference10.
Smuggled cigarettes were by no means the only way domestic terrorist cells raised funds. In the late 1990’s
local and federal authorities broke up several baby formula shoplifting rings in Texas. These rings were
organized so that individuals, called boosters, were paid one dollar per bottle of baby formula stolen. These
bottles were then stripped of their store tags and repackaged; through phony companies they were then resold
to retailers at cost. These rings were so large and so successful that the largest one netted an estimated $44
million in only 18 months11.

3. ISIS Anomaly:
Crime as a method of supplementing donor money has previously been discussed, but there is one significant
deviant from the usual terrorist finance model. What sets ISIS apart is not the use of smuggling, as other
groups also use it to varying degrees, what is unique is their predominant reliance on crime to fund terrorist
operations. In contrast to the majority of terrorist groups that use crime to supplement the money they receive
from donations, ISIS takes the opposite approach-- relying on crime to fund its operations. In doing so ISIS
acts with the sophistication and intensity associated more with the mafia than a small or common terrorist
organization. ISIS has exploded onto the global scene, seemingly from nowhere. After further observation,
however, we see that it was merely hiding in the shadows before choosing to step into the light. Mosul is
where ISIS first reared its head and now serves as a nerve center of sorts for the organization12. The city of

Mosul is comparable to the city of Chicago, Illinois, during the 1920’s. Like Chicago, where the city
government ostensibly ran the city, the real power lay with criminals. As Al Capone and his Italian mafia
ruled Chicago, so ISIS rules Mosul13.
Compared to many terrorist organizations, ISIS is highly organized. Their relative sophistication helps to
explain their rapid expansion in the area, into an interwoven system of terrorist cells. Each cell is independent,
in that it plans its own terrorist acts, however, the finances are what tie the cell to the leaders of ISIS. After a
cell plans their attack they raise their own money to finance the planned act. If they can’t self-fund through
crime and the act is deemed necessary, they have the option of receiving aid from ISIS leaders, who control
a pool of money that has been accumulated through a tribute system. As long as a cell is operational it pays
a portion of its total funds to ISIS leaders who then can distribute it to cells who are struggling or help fund
a particularly large attack14. Each cell earns money through a variety of crimes such as: extortion, theft, and
smuggling fees. Whereas donations usually make up a large portion of terrorist funds, it is estimated that
ISIS receives no more than 5% of its income from donations15. Those donations that it does receive come
largely from the Arab Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar16.

4. Donations:
4.1 Pakistan:
As stated previously, donor support makes up a large portion of terrorist funds; in fact, there are several
terrorist organizations that were created by sovereign states and are arguably sustained by them. The benefits
are clear, as outlaws, terrorist organizations attract the attention and blame for their direct actions whereas
the nation-states behind them maintain a degree of deniability. One example of state-sponsored terror is
Pakistan. The Pakistani nation is not very large geographically. Pakistan is also surrounded by countries with
which it has fought or believes them to represent threats to their sovereignty. As a result, Pakistan has sought
a means of control and security over its neighbors. In response to the Soviet threat in the Middle East during
the Cold War, the Pakistani government actually created several terrorist organizations that reported directly
to the secretive Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). This is the Pakistani equivalent of the CIA.
These organizations, such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, exist for specific purposes, including retaining
regional influence17.
State sponsored terror groups pose challenges for the nation-states that create them since they cannot be
sure whether the terrorists will remain faithful to their creator or be willing to continue to do their bidding.
Pakistan’s intelligence organization is a glaring example, having lost control of several of these groups, which
now act independently of Pakistan and pose a threat to United States interests and their own region18. Despite
losing control of several terrorist organizations Pakistan has continued its involvement with terror groups.
For example, Pakistan may have gained control, or influence in, Al-Qaeda19. In an interesting turn of events,
the Pakistani government supported the United States in pursuing and dealing a massive blow to Al-Qaeda,
and yet there is speculation that Pakistan may in fact now be a significant influencer on Al-Qaeda operations.
As Dr. Catino, a counterinsurgency adviser who has served with the US Army during the War on Terror,
explains it, the Pakistani army did deal significant damage to local Al-Qaeda operatives but left the leadership
untouched20. It seems as if they had the ability to finish off key leaders and yet chose to leave them alive.
This, coupled with the country’s history in maintaining relationships with terrorist organizations, makes them
suspect of being in a position of power within Al-Qaeda.

4.2 Saudi Arabia:
To date, the United States has not declared Saudi Arabia to be a state sponsor of terror. Instead, the United
States continues to treat Saudi Arabia as an ally. The fact that Saudi Arabia is not an official state sponsor,
however, should not be confused as equivalent to having clean hands. Since 9/11, Saudi Arabia has been
criticized for its lack of action to police its citizens and stop support for terrorist supporting organizations.
Recently, a leaked message from Hillary Clinton, during her time as Secretary of State, to Saudi royalty
detailed requests that they (Saudi Arabia) take seriously the fact that their citizens were actively sending
donations to terrorist organizations21. This email highlights how countries that want the benefits of
relationships with terrorists can officially denounce terrorism while creating an environment for them to
prosper by turning a blind eye to their conduct within their own borders.

The Saudi government, however, goes much farther in supporting terrorists. For example, Saudi Arabia
has provided material support for Al-Qaeda in the Bosnian War as well as monetary support to the terrorists
who brought down the Twin Towers. During the Bosnian War Al-Qaeda sent fighters to become mujahedeen
and fight with the Bosnian Muslims against the Bosnian Serbs. Testimony from an Al-Qaeda defector, Ali
Ahmad Ali Hamad, provides direct evidence that Al-Qaeda intended to set up long-term bases in Bosnia for
future operations, as well as, evidence of material support from the Saudi government22. Hamad provided
testimony that Saudi officials, specifically from the Saudi High Commission for Relief in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, gave material assistance to Al-Qaeda fighters and provided him access to diplomatic cars,
allowing him uninhibited travel throughout Bosnia23. After the war the Commission provided Hamad and
several other mujahedeen employment at the Saudi High Commission, while being aware that Hamad was
acting under the direction of Al-Qaeda24. This type of blatant support from several countries presents a very
clear threat to any positive action that a government or entity tries to take to stem the flow of money to
terrorist organizations.

5. Legitimate Business:
While individual countries providing support to terrorist organizations certainly is a grave international
threat, it is perhaps more disturbing domestically, that there are entities masquerading as charities that are
supporters of international terrorism. There are several charities that operate within the United States that
profess to take money in support of humanitarian aid in the Middle East, however, a closer examination
reveals that many take the money and give it to terrorist organizations. For the individual trying to support
true humanitarian efforts in the Middle East, determining which charities are fronts for terrorism is very
difficult. In fact, the United States government has failed to make public a list of appropriate charities to
Muslim groups who wish to truly invest in charity. The driving force behind misappropriation of charities
stems from the teachings of Islam that require a zakat, or mandatory tithe. Unlike Christian tithes, which are
not enforced by the state, Muslim countries enforce the giving of money to the state for redistribution;
Muslims abroad are expected to give to charities that will invest back in the Middle East25. The Saudi
government is a prime example of how such charitable requirements can be abused. As many Muslim
countries do, the Saudi’s collect taxes from citizens to be used exclusively in fulfillment of zakat. The
distribution of the money, however, is entirely up to the State. Since the State’s official religion is
Wahhabism, a sect of Islam that is viewed as supporting extremism and an ultra-orthodox view of Islam,
Saudi Arabia can support the families, activities, and provide the other necessities of Saudi Muslims who
support terror without violating their religion26. Moreover, they can argue that their religion compels them to
do so. The charities that many international Muslims donate to are also suspect. Several, such as the: Global
Relief Foundation; Holy Land Foundation; and Third World Relief Agency, take donations and give them to
terrorist organizations27,28. The mixing of legitimate charity organizations with members of the same that
contribute to terrorism makes the question of determining what charity donations fall into the category of
legitimate a daunting challenge. The examples given above are not the only examples of where this happens.
The reality, however, is that on the surface their criminality was by no means, immediately obvious to
investigators or the government of the United States. The investigations required painstakingly difficult work
to piercing the corporate veil and see what was really happening to the money being raised. Finally, even
where the source of the funding is discovered to be suspect, separating legitimate charities from those that
are terrorist affiliated is very difficult given the opaque nature of the industry that allows for a great level of
anonymity in distributing the funds they manage.

6. Hawala:
Financial Crime typically involves a high degree of secrecy to prevent a country’s tax or justice authorities
from tracking the movement of money and its owners. While financial crimes are perceived as being complex
white-collar activities, moving money efficiently without leaving a trail has a long history. Moving money
within countries and across borders to different cells of a terrorist organization or in-between individuals
often involves wire transfers and banking systems where privacy is sacrosanct. What many do not know is
that there exists a global money transfer system that does not use traditional banks and has not paper trail.
This informal system is called hawala. Hawala is the term used to refer to the massive, worldwide network
of informal bankers who move money around for various reasons. It is important to note that there are many

legitimate uses for hawala, chiefly for sending remittance money home for many foreign workers in the
United States. One of the biggest users of this technique involves the large Somali population in Minnesota.
As they earn money in the United States, they want to send it home, however, due to the lack of any
trustworthy financial institutions in Somalia they have to rely on informal hawala bankers29. That said, there
are also many less noble uses for the system, as it is just that, a system and is only as good as those who use
it. The system works without any laws or regulations, only the “honor” of each individual. That honor is
really dependent on the trust of each individual banker, or hawaladar, to repay debts to each other. A
simplified view of how an individual transaction occurs is pictured (Figure 1) below.

Figure 1: Hawala transaction system
Figure 1 Retrieved from GAO November 2003 report on terrorist financing
When one person wants to send money abroad they contact the individual they wish to send money to, figure
out how much and set a passcode to be used later for retrieving the funds. Then, Person A meets with a
hawaladar who will record how much money is to be sent. The hawladar with the funds will contact a
hawaladar that is located near the intended recipient of the funds. The second hawaladar will pay out the
money to whoever gives him the correct passcode. There is no wiring of funds from one hawaladar to another,
instead the hawaladars pay out of their pocket. In order to settle debts and ensure that no one loses money,
debts are settled through the exchange of goods, services, or cancellation of prior debts30.

7. Conclusion:
The problem of terrorist financing is a problem that is immediate and dangerous to the American people and
yet it presents itself not just within the jurisdictional boundaries of the United States. Instead, the problem is
multinational and crosses borders without distinction. The proceeds of criminal activity, charitable donations,
and seemingly legitimate business are three major avenues used to fund terrorism. Due to the fact that
criminal activity takes so many forms and the use of new technologies and ancient methods of moving money

make any one way of combatting this problem futile, investigative efforts must keep up with new techniques
and tools used by terrorists. While the horrific crime and act of war engaged in on 9/11 brought great attention
to Al Qaeda, it is perhaps what ISIS is doing that should concern governments. As discussed above, ISIS has
mastered methods of benefiting from criminal activity, even when it does not directly perpetrate the crime.
Moreover, it is now an example for why terrorists must control territory, especially where it can extort money
from criminals that must cross territory they control. An in depth study of this group in particular could yield
interesting and effective methods for combating future terrorist organizations who seek to model themselves
after ISIS because of their success. For the time being, however, it appears that donations are the backbone
of terrorism financing and mainly come in the form of government aid from sympathizing countries or large
monetary donations by wealthy individuals. In both cases a bulk of donations come from Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, and other Arab Nations and their involvement is well known. The question then, is whether there
is a will to disturb an otherwise positive diplomatic relationship or not. The guise of legitimate business to
bankroll terrorism, whether a nonprofit corporation or charity or for-profit business, poses challenges for law
enforcement and regulators who face limited budgets and the need to address serious and violent crime. Is
the answer more regulation and would that approach hurt legitimate efforts to help desperate people in terrible
circumstances?
What is known is that terrorism is on the rise and with it, the demand for ever greater funding. Arguably,
the solution will require at least this—that governments continue to shine a light on those of means, whether
or not in government, who are actively involved in sponsoring terrorism or simply turning a blind eye toward
the activity. Those who have both a public image to uphold and by virtue of the image are also likely to be
powerful people, may yet, because of fear of exposure be convinced that it is in no one’s interest, especially
theirs, to allow terror to prosper.
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